

1. The Administration will probably issue its Executive order on Intelligence and reorganize PFIAB this fall. These measures will formalize the settlement of issues about which there is no longer any major difference of opinion (except over ~~details of~~ wording that may be over-restrictive). It is clear, however, that more fundamental change in the organization and management of the Community and of CIA is under discussion in both the Legislative and Executive Branches; the intelligence provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 are certain to be reconsidered and probably will be rewritten. Before this can be accomplished, however, Congress, the Administration, and the Community itself will have to engage in ^{lengthy and} intensive debate on many complex matters.

2. A not unreasonable projection of the course of events we face is that the Senate and House investigations will drag on until the oncoming ~~requirements of~~ the 1976 election forces the participants to set the investigations aside. At that point they will, if they are able, make recommendations for legislation. The pressure of time, however, will require that these recommendations be addressed to the new Congress taking office in 1977. Thus, after a suitable period for education, the new Congress will be ready to begin a dialogue with the Executive about the future of the Intelligence Community at mid-year 1977.

3. We are thus faced with as much as two years more of rudderless drift, during which we and the rest of the Community will have no guidance as to the future shape or purpose of American intelligence. During that time encroachments by Defense on the independence of the DCI and the present fraying away of the morale and cohesion of CIA will continue. Moreover, important events will occur that require decision on things that appear matters of detail, but are in fact rooted in principle. One example is organization These decisions must fit into a larger blueprint for the Community if they are to make sense. No such blueprint can be prepared until the Legislative-Executive dialogue is over, and without it Defense has a vacuum to fill. [Moreover, should the President wish to appoint a new DCI, it is difficult to imagine a candidate who would take the job until he knows how it is to be defined.]

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4. Under these circumstances, the DCI of 1977 is likely to receive his marching orders after Defense is in possession of the battlefield and with his own troops severely weakened by several years of erosion. The chances of providing a strong, independent and objective national intelligence capability--the intent of Congress in 1947--will be poor indeed.

5. What is needed is to shortcut the process. There is no reason why informed debate cannot begin while the investigations are still in progress. If work began now, it might be possible to arrive at an agreed package of changes early in 1976, and to enact these into statute before the political campaign. A year and a half of destructive uncertainty for our national intelligence system might thus be avoided.

6. We recommend that the DCI suggest to the President that he

- Call in the Congressional leadership, including the CIA oversight subcommittees and the Select Committees.

- Point out to them the destructive effects of delay, and urge that proposals for the future be decoupled from investigation and correction of past abuses.

- Request that they, in cooperation with the Executive, begin work now to develop whatever legislative proposals in the organizational field seem appropriate.

- Set a target date of, perhaps, 1 February for submission of agreed legislation to Congress.